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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal arises from a diversity action for malicious 
prosecution that Luis Trabal and Jerome Q. Ford brought 
against Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation. The 
district court denied Wells Fargo's motion for summary 
judgment and sua sponte granted partial summary 
judgment to Trabal and Ford based upon the court's 
conclusion that defendant could not establish lack of 
probable cause to prosecute Trabal and Ford as a matter of 
law. The court thereafter entered judgment for Trabal and 
Ford based upon a jury verdict in their favor and against 
Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo appeals. 
 
For the reasons that follow, we hold that the charges that 
Wells Fargo initiated against Trabal and Ford were 
supported by probable cause. Inasmuch as probable cause 
is the sine qua non element of the tort of malicious 
prosecution, we will reverse and remand to the district 
court with instructions to enter judgment for Wells Fargo. 
 
I. Background Facts 
 
This dispute centers around the disappearance of a First 
Fidelity Bank money bag containing $190,000. On June 16, 
1993, Robert Emond checked the bag in question out of a 
Wells Fargo vault. He thereafter reported the bag missing 
when he and his partner, Luis Matias, arrived at First 
Fidelity later that same day. 
 
William J. Cianci, Wells Fargo Security Loss Prevention 
Manager, initially focused on Emond and Matias as 
possible suspects in the investigation. Cianci fruitlessly 
checked Emond and Matias's credit histories and took 
statements from Emond, Matias, and employees in charge 
of the vault. Both Emond and Matias indicated that Emond 
was "fooling around" at the loading dock around the time 
the money bag disappeared. 
 
On June 18, 1993, Carlos Rodriguez, another Wells Fargo 
employee, telephoned Cianci and reported that he had 
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observed the theft of the bag. On June 21, 1993, Rodriguez 
gave two sworn statements to Cianci in which Rodriguez 
related what purported to be his eyewitness account of the 
events on the morning in question. In those statements, 
Rodriguez stated that Emond had dropped his pants on the 
loading dock and, in the midst of his fooling around, 
Emond's cart broke loose and rolled across the floor. One 
First Fidelity Bank money bag dropped from the cart and 
Luis Trabal stopped the cart with his foot. Rodriguez said 
he then "saw Luis Trabal bend down and pick up a white 
FFB bag," "thr[o]w it into truck No. 701," and "kick the cart 
back to Emond." App. at 105-108. Truck No. 701 was 
assigned to Jerome Q. Ford and Jack D'Elia. 
 
On June 21, 1993, Cianci interviewed Trabal, Ford, and 
D'Elia. Each of them denied any involvement with, or 
knowledge of, the missing money bag. Ford and D'Elia, did, 
however, admit that later during the day in question they 
had made an unauthorized and unlogged stop at D'Elia's 
home with their armored Truck No. 701. 
 
On June 22, 1993, Cianci summoned Det. Sgt. Mileski of 
the Lynhurst police to the Wells Fargo facility and both men 
re-interviewed the employees. Trabal, D'Elia, and Ford 
again denied any involvement. Trabal and D'Elia gave 
written statements, and Ford invoked his Miranda  rights 
and left the interview. Rodriguez refused to be interviewed, 
resigned from Wells Fargo, and left the facility. On his way 
out, he reconfirmed his account of the theft. In doing so, he 
informed Cianci that he was afraid to speak to the police 
because Burt Terrely,1 a union representative monitoring 
the investigation, had threatened to "find the rat" who had 
implicated union employees. Cianci did not interview 
Terrely. Cianci later explained that decision as follows: "[i]t 
had no bearing on the case, you know, he's a union man 
and I just stayed away from the union." App. at 296. Cianci 
also did not interview the two other employees present at 
the alleged incident, namely Benny Pareja (Rodriguez's 
partner) and Brian Cenicola (Trabal's partner). 
 
On June 24, 1993, Cianci filed a criminal complaint 
against Trabal, Ford, and D'Elia based primarily on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The briefs also refer to him as "Turelli" and "Turrelli." 
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Rodriguez's statements. Trabal and Ford turned themselves 
in and spent two nights in custody before they posted bail 
on the third day. 
 
Meanwhile, Cianci unsuccessfully tried to telephone 
Rodriguez. Cianci did eventually speak to Rodriguez by 
telephone, and Rodriguez agreed to resume cooperation 
with the investigation. Rodriguez subsequently gave 
statements to the Lynhurst police which described his 
reason for previously withdrawing his cooperation. In those 
statements, he reconfirmed the earlier statements he had 
given Cianci. 
 
On June 29, 1993, Mileski interviewed Luis Matias 
(Emond's partner) and Brian Cenicola (Trabal's partner). 
Matias confirmed that the cart rolled away from Emond and 
that the missing bag was not on the cart when Matias 
subsequently loaded the truck. Cenicola confirmed that the 
cart rolled over to Trabal who stopped it with his foot. 
However, Cenicola maintained that he did not know what 
happened afterward. 
 
On March, 16 1994, Cianci testified before the Bergen 
County grand jury, which thereafter indicted Trabal, Ford, 
and D'Elia for theft. However, three years later, the Bergen 
County Superior Court dismissed the charges based upon 
the voluntary application of the Assistant Prosecutor, 
James Addis. Addis had recently been assigned to the case, 
and he concluded that subsequent events seriously 
impaired Rodriguez's credibility. In 1996, Rodriguez had 
pled guilty to endangering the welfare of a minor. In 
addition, in late 1996, he made "odd comments" to Addis in 
which he stated that Emond "pulled down his pants" so 
that he could "urinat[e] into the air and catch it in his 
mouth." App. at 9, 34. His recollection of the events 
surrounding the "horse play" on the dock had not 
previously captured that little detail. 
 
After the criminal charges were dismissed, Trabal and 
Ford brought separate suits against Wells Fargo. Both 
complaints alleged malicious prosecution, false arrest, 
wrongful termination of employment, negligence, and 
slander. With the exception of the tort of malicious 
prosecution, all counts of the complaints were dismissed by 
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motions and consent. Wells Fargo filed this appeal following 
the aforementioned jury verdict in favor of those plaintiffs 
for malicious prosecution. 
 
II. Procedural History 
 
Trabal and Ford initiated their tort actions in state court, 
but Wells Fargo thereafter removed them to the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey where 
the suits were consolidated. Both complaints alleged 
malicious prosecution, false arrest, wrongful termination of 
employment, negligence, and slander. All of those counts, 
except for the count claiming malicious prosecution, were 
dismissed by motion or consent. 
 
Wells Fargo moved for summary judgment based upon its 
assertion that plaintiffs could not establish the requisite 
malice because Cianci had sufficient evidence to establish 
probable cause to institute criminal proceedings against 
Trabal and Ford as evidenced by the indictment returned 
by the grand jury. Trabal and Ford did not file cross- 
motions for summary judgment. Rather, they argued the 
existence of genuine issues of material fact. On February 
29, 2000, without oral argument, the district court denied 
Wells Fargo's motion. It also granted partial summary 
judgment to Trabal and Ford sua sponte based upon the 
court's conclusion that Wells Fargo lacked probable cause 
to prosecute them. The court thereafter denied Wells 
Fargo's motion for reconsideration, and the matter 
proceeded to trial on the malicious prosecution counts. 
 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the district court 
instructed the jury that two of the four elements of 
malicious prosecution were not disputed -- namely, that (a) 
Wells Fargo had instituted criminal proceedings against 
Trabal and Ford and (b) those proceedings had terminated 
in Trabal and Ford's favor. The district court further 
instructed the jury that the element of lack of probable 
cause had already been decided by the court as a matter of 
law. The court then charged that the jury could infer the 
remaining element of plaintiffs' cause of action, malice, 
from the lack of probable cause. The jury returned a verdict 
for the plaintiffs and awarded $825,000 compensatory 
damages and $1,000 punitive damages to each plaintiff. 
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The court denied Wells Fargo's timely motion for 
judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), 
and entered judgment against Wells Fargo in the amount of 
$1,652,000.2 Wells Fargo then filed a motion under Rule 50 
and moved in the alternative for a remittitur of damage 
awards or for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. The district 





Under New Jersey law, malicious prosecution has four 
elements. Plaintiff must establish that the defendant (1) 
instituted proceedings (2) without probable cause and (3) 
with legal malice; and (4) the proceedings terminated in 
favor of the plaintiff. Lightning Lube v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 
1153, 1197 (3d Cir. 1993). Failure to prove any one of these 
four elements denies the plaintiff a cause of action. Fleming 
v. United Parcel Service, 604 A.2d 1029, 1030 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1992), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 847 (1995). The 
district court correctly noted that the first and fourth 
elements were not contested. The court's pretrial ruling that 
defendant lacked probable cause led the court to instruct 
that the third element, malice, could be inferred. 
Accordingly, our inquiry boils down to determining whether 
Wells Fargo had sufficient evidence to constitute probable 
cause to initiate a criminal prosecution of the plaintiffs. If 
it did, there could be no malice, and the court therefore 
improperly denied Wells Fargo's motion for summary 
judgment. As noted above, the district court granted Trabal 
and Ford partial summary judgment on the issue of 
probable cause sua sponte.3 The court apparently 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) allows the trial court to enter judgment as a 
matter of law at the conclusion of a jury trial notwithstanding a jury 
verdict for the opposing party. 
 
3. We have previously stated that a district court may not enter 
summary judgment against a party without affording that party notice 
and an opportunity to respond. In Chambers Development Co. v. Passaic 
County Utilities Authority, 62 F.3d 582 (3rd Cir. 1995), we stated: 
 
        Although authority has developed to allow a court to grant 
       summary judgment to a non-moving party, a judgment cannot be 
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concluded that Rodriguez's eyewitness account lacked 
corroboration and Wells Fargo's investigation was 
incomplete and speculative. The court noted Wells Fargo's 
failure to investigate Rodriguez's credibility, check Trabal's 
and Ford's credit, and interview everyone who may have 
possessed relevant information. 
 
We are now asked to review the district court's denial of 
Wells Fargo's Rule 50(b) motion following the jury's verdict 
for the plaintiffs. 
 
A. Standard of Review 
 
Our review of the district court's denial of a Rule 50(b) 
motion is plenary. "More particularly, a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict may be granted under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 50(b) `only if, as a matter of law, the record is 
critically deficient of that minimum quantity of evidence 
from which a jury might reasonably afford relief.' " Powell v. 
J.T. Posey Co., 766 F.2d 131, 133-4 (3d Cir. 1985). In 
reviewing the record, we must apply the same standard as 
the trial court in determining the propriety of a judgment 
n.o.v. Id. at 134. 
 
Under New Jersey law, where the underlying facts in a 
malicious prosecution action are not disputed, the 
existence of probable cause is an issue of law. Lind v. 
Schmid, 337 A. 2d 365, 370 (N.J. 1975) ("Where the facts 
are undisputed, the existence or non-existence of probable 
cause is a question of law.") See also, Campione v. Adamar 
of New Jersey, 694 A. 2d 1045, 1056 (N.J. Super. 1997) 
(" `where the facts are not controverted the question of 
probable cause is one of law to be determined by the court, 
and its submission to the jury is improper.' ") Accordingly, 




       entered without first placing the adversarial party on notice that 
the 
       court is considering a sua sponte summary judgment motion. The 
       court must also provide the party with an opportunity to present 
       relevant evidence in opposition to that motion. 
 
62 F.3d at 583, n.5 (citations omitted). However, inasmuch as we hold 
that the district court erred in not granting Wells Fargo's motion under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, we need not discuss this procedural error. 
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B. Substantive Element of Probable Cause 
 
As noted above, lack of probable cause is a sine qua non 
of malicious prosecution. Campione, 694 A.2d at 1055 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (citing Lind v. Schmid, 337 A.2d 
365, 368 (N.J. 1975)). 
 
       "probable cause" means reasonable grounds for 
       suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently 
       strong in themselves to warrant an ordinarily cautious 
       [person] in the belief that the accused is guilty of the 
       offen[s]e with which he is charged. 
 
Lind, 337 A.2d 365 at 369. The plaintiff in a malicious 
prosecution action has the burden of proving that the 
defendant lacked probable cause when he/she initiated 
charges against the plaintiff. Id. at 368. The defendant does 
not have to prove the existence of probable cause. 
 
Here, the uncontested evidence establishes probable 
cause for the prosecution Wells Fargo initiated against the 
plaintiffs. When Cianci filed the criminal complaint, he 
possessed sufficient evidence to reasonably believe that 
Trabal and Ford were parties to the theft of the money bag. 
Rodriguez gave two sworn statements that he saw Trabal 
throw the money bag from Emond's cart onto Ford's truck. 
This is consistent with, and confirmed by, the fact that 
Ford and D'Elia independently admitted that they made an 
unauthorized and unlogged stop with their armored truck 
at D'Elia's house later that same day. 
 
Rodriguez's sworn statement contains what he 
represented as an eyewitness account of events 
surrounding the disappearance of the missing money bag. 
The fact that Rodriguez was later considered to be an 
unreliable witness does not negate what Cianci knew when 
he initiated charges against the plaintiffs on behalf of Wells 
Fargo. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that 
"[p]robable cause to arrest can be based on the statement 
from a witness or informant." Wildoner v. Borough of 
Ramsey, 744 A.2d 1146, 1154 (N.J. 2000). Rodriguez's 
ensuing credibility problems go to his effectiveness as a 
witness, and perhaps to his veracity, but not to what Cianci 
reasonably believed after taking Rodriguez's statement and 
referring the matter for criminal prosecution. Given Cianci's 
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information, it was reasonable for him to rely on 
Rodriguez's statements in filing the complaint. 
 
Immediately after he refused to speak to the police, 
Rodriguez gave a credible explanation of his refusal and 
reconfirmed his consistent eyewitness account to Cianci. 
The court in Wildoner explained that the reliability of 
concerned citizens who report criminal activity is grounded 
on the assumption that the witness is being truthful, and 
is "heightened still further when the citizen provides the 
police with a sworn statement, thus subjecting himself or 
herself to potential civil or criminal liability." Id. at 1155 
(quoting Sanducci v. City of Hoboken, 719 A.2d 160, 163 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998)). Rodriguez appeared to be 
just such a disinterested citizen who did "not expect any 
gain or concession in exchange for his information." Id. 
(quoting State v. Lakomy, 315 A.2d 46, 50 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1974). 
 
In State of New Jersey In the Interest of J.L.W. , the New 
Jersey Superior Court held that probable cause existed for 
filing a criminal complaint where one witness stated that 
the defendant fired a gun into an occupied home and 
another witness recanted his sworn statement regarding 
the defendant firing a gun into a different occupied home at 
a different occasion. 565 A.2d 1106, 1112 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1989). Although the criminal complaint against 
J.L.W. was based solely on an oral statement and a 
recanted sworn statement of an unrelated incident, the 
court ruled that the similarity of the two uncorroborated 
accounts "mutually bolsters" their credibility and was 
sufficient to constitute probable cause. Id. 
 
Ford and D'Elia's unauthorized stop with their armored 
truck strongly supports Rodriguez's account of the theft. 
Ford and D'Elia admitted making that stop and not 
entering it on their official log. That could only bolster 
Cianci's suspicions, and Rodriguez's statements. In 
addition, both Emond and Matias admitted that Emond 
was "horsing" around when they were initially interviewed 
by Cianci, and that added additional corroboration to 
Rodriguez's statement. 
 
Trabal and Ford argue that Cianci was reckless in his 
investigation because he failed to investigate Rodriguez's 
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credibility, Trabal and Ford's credit records, or interview 
everyone who may have possessed relevant information. 
However, the law does not require that a prosecutor explore 
every potentially exculpatory lead before filing a criminal 
complaint or initiating a prosecution. "The reasonable belief 
which constitutes probable cause does not require[a 
complainant] to evaluate the totality of circumstances both 
inculpatory and exculpatory, as a trier of fact guided by a 
reasonable doubt standard." Carollo v. Supermarkets 
General Corp., 597 A.2d 1105, 1108-09 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1991). "Probable cause does not depend on the 
state of the case in point of fact but upon the honest and 
reasonable belief of the party prosecuting," Martinez v. E.J. 
Korvette, 477 F.2d 1014, 1016 (3d Cir. 1973), and "[n]o 
more is demanded than a well-grounded suspicion or 
belief," J.L.W., 565 A.2d at 1112. 
 
Moreover, even if such meticulousness was required, 
nothing on this record establishes that any of those steps 
would have exculpated Trabal and Ford. This is especially 
true given Rodriguez's statement and the aforementioned 
corroboration. Even assuming that the plaintiffs' credit 
history was impeccable, it would not have negated that 
evidence of their involvement with the missing money bag. 
In fact, the evidence of their guilt was sufficient to support 
a grand jury indictment. That indictment establishes 
probable cause by definition, and it does not evaporate 
simply because the prosecutor later decided that 
subsequent events compromised Rodriguez's value as a 
witness. As noted above, that was something that happened 
after Cianci initiated the prosecution of plaintiffs. Thus, 
"the record is critically deficient of that minimum quantity 
of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford 
relief[ ]' " for Trabal and Ford.Powell, 766 F.2d at 133-4.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Of course, we do not mean to suggest that Trabal and Ford were in 
any way involved in the disappearance of the money bag. That is not the 
issue before us, and we do not intend to imply anything about the guilt 
of either of these plaintiffs. Inasmuch as they have not been proven 
guilty, they remain innocent in the eyes of the law. 
 





For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the criminal 
complaint that Cianci initiated against Trabal and Ford on 
behalf of Wells Fargo was supported by probable cause. 
Thus, the plaintiffs here cannot establish the lack of 
probable cause and the malice necessary to their claim of 
malicious prosecution, and the district court should 
therefore have granted Wells Fargo's Rule 50(b) motion on 
that claim. Accordingly, we will remand this matter to the 
district court with instructions that it vacate the judgment 
previously entered for the plaintiffs, and instead enter 
judgment for Wells Fargo against Trabal and Ford. 
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